Europe: Russia
DEFENSE
Russia's efforts to transform its Soviet-legacy military into a smaller, lighter, and more mobile force continue to be hampered by an ossified military leadership, discipline problems and human rights violations, limited funding, and demographics. Recent steps by the Government of Russia suggest a desire to reform, and the August 2008 conflict with Georgia further highlighted the need for Russia to modernize its armed forces. There has been an increased emphasis on practical training, and the government is introducing bills to improve the organization of the military.
Despite recent increases in the budget, however, defense spending is still unable to sustain Russia's oversized military. Current troop strength, estimated at 1.1 million, is large in comparison to Russia's GDP and military budget, which continues to make the process of transformation to a professional army difficult. This is the result of the Soviet legacy and military thinking that has changed little since the Cold War. Senior Russian leaders continue to emphasize a reliance on a large strategic nuclear force capable of deterring a massive nuclear attack.
Russian military salaries are low. Theoretically, the army provides all necessities, but housing and food shortages continue to plague the armed forces. Problems with both discipline and brutal hazing are common as well. Such conditions continue to encourage draft evasion and efforts to delay military service. Moreover, military officials complain that new recruit cohorts are plagued by increasing incidences of poor education, communicable diseases, and criminality. HIV infection rates in the Russian army are estimated to be between two and five times higher than in the general population, and tuberculosis is a persistent problem.
The Russian Government has stated a desire to convert to a professional army, but implementation has been progressing slowly. In an effort to make military service more attractive, the tour of duty for conscripts was reduced to one year (from 18 months) beginning in 2008, and the military is offering increased pay and benefits to raise the number of professional servicemen. Current plans envision a transition to a mixed force, in which professional soldiers fill approximately 70%, including in select units, and conscription fills 30%. There is also an effort to develop a non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps, but the military faces difficulties recruiting NCOs, and has done little to develop the mechanisms and capability to sustain such a force.
U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS
By the end of 2008 and in the wake of the Russia-Georgia war, U.S.-Russia relations were at a low and characterized by mutual frustration and an adversarial drift. The change in the U.S. administration in January 2009 provided a diplomatic opportunity for both sides to change the tone of the relationship and cooperate in areas of mutual interest. Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitriy Medvedev first met in April 2009 on the margins of a multilateral summit to address the global financial crisis, where they resolved to negotiate the New START Treaty. In July of that year, the two leaders met for a bilateral summit where they reached additional agreements on nuclear security, cooperation on Afghanistan, military-to-military cooperation, a joint commission on POW/MIAs, and the formation of the Bilateral Presidential Commission. The New START Treaty was signed in April 2010.
The Bilateral Presidential Commission is dedicated to identifying areas of cooperation and pursuing joint projects and actions that strengthen strategic stability, international security, economic well-being, and the development of ties between the Russian and American people. It is intended to serve as a regular and structured mechanism to advance the highest-priority bilateral objectives through 16 working groups chaired by senior government officials from a variety of agencies and ministries. Working groups have been formed on the following topics: policy steering; agriculture; arms control; business development and economic relations; civil society; counterterrorism; counter-narcotics; education, culture, sports, and mass media; science and technology; energy; environment; emergency situations; health; military to military; nuclear energy and nuclear security and space cooperation.
The United States and Russia share interests in all of these areas but, as the world’s leading nuclear powers, the countries share a particular interest and responsibility in the areas of nuclear energy, security, and nonproliferation. The U.S. and Russia work closely on initiatives to address the threat of nuclear terrorism and keep terrorists from acquiring nuclear materials. We are working with Russia to bring Iran's nuclear programs into compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rules and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803. On North Korea, Russia is a participant in the Six-Party Talks aimed at the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Despite this cooperation, there remain areas in which the U.S. and Russia disagree, including Moscow’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As the U.S. and its NATO allies begin a review of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, we are also in the early stages of a renewed debate with Russia over the architecture of security arrangements in Europe. The recently improved relations with Russia provide an improved atmosphere to address these disagreements.
