The Americas
Hugo Chavez's Hidden Intentions
By Leah VilkanskasSeptember 1, 2009Region: South and Central America
Topics: Diplomacy, Security
Email the Editors: Editor@ascfusa.org
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has suddenly pushed the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to end its dramatic attempt at overthrowing Colombia’s government and release all of its hostages. This is a turnaround from just months ago when Chávez recognized FARC as a legitimate rebel force and was caught red-handed financing the group. Why the change of heart?
Chávez gave several reasons for his shocking reversal. The foremost was in his direct message to the 50-year-old Marxist narco-terrorist group. “You in the FARC should know something, you have become an excuse for the empire [the U.S.] to threaten all of us,” he said. This could mean one of two things. Either Chávez is nervous about being on the U.S.’s bad side, or he wants the U.S. to be diverted elsewhere while he seeks to gain additional power.
Chávez, in his FARC statement, declared that, “the guerrilla war is history. At this moment in Latin America, an armed guerrilla movement is out of place.” He discussed the positive points of making FARC purely political. If he truly believes this, it would represent realpolitik and an effort to move FARC into a more effective position to alter the Colombian political system. Currently, the rebel group has the support of less than 5% of the nation’s population. A peaceful political party might be better suited to gain popular support.
Transition from armed insurrection to a peaceful political party might be attainable under new leadership. Alfonso Cano has just become FARC’s commander in chief, after the death of former leader Manuel Marulanda. Cano is less of a “ferocious warrior” and more of an intellectual than many FARC members had hoped. Perhaps Chávez sees this transition between leaders also as an ideal time to switch tactics. Who better to lead the change than the group’s only influential international friend?
Another implication of the leadership change, combined with increased U.S. pressure and a slew of misfortunes including the death of two other top commanders, is that FARC is less organized and weaker than ever before. The number of FARC members has dwindled from an estimated 18,000 members in 2002 to about 8,000 currently, and the group’s actions have not produced significant casualties since 2006. Chávez might believe the demise of FARC is inevitable. If Chávez not only saved the organization, but also made its methods more acceptable and successful, he could gain great political clout at home and abroad.
Chávez’s international reputation is currently in shambles due to damning evidence of his support found in laptops captured in May and his implementation of a new intelligence law, which drew worldwide condemnation as a barely concealed effort to silence political opposition. Also, the day prior to Chávez’s statement, Colombian officials arrested a Venezuelan national guard sergeant in the border area between Venezuela and Colombia, who was supposedly transporting 40,000 rounds of ammunition to FARC.
To distance himself from his international image, Chávez needs to do something drastic. Unexpectedly calling for FARC to abandon its armed struggle to overthrow the Colombian government and release its hostages certainly accomplishes that task. His statement could help mend hard feelings with the many countries he has alienated.
In fact, it already has: “The move meant that Colombia and Venezuela would be able to renew their ties, to the benefit of both nations,” stated the Colombian Defense Minister Juan Manuel, according to BBC News. Will Chavez continue to push towards FARC ending its armed rebellion and freeing hostages? And beyond that, will FARC respond? For most, skepticism predominates.